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ABSTRACT
Malaria, tuberculosis, and the strains of HIV common in Africa kill approximately 5 million
people each year. Yet research on vaccines for these diseases remains minimal—largely because
potential vaccine developers fear that they would not be able to sell enough vaccine at a sufficient
price to recoup their research expenditures.
Enhancing markets for new vaccines could create incentives for vaccine research and increase
accessibility of any vaccines developed. For example, the World Bank has proposed establishing a
fund to help developing countries finance purchases of specified vaccines if they are invented. The
U.S. administration’s budget proposal includes a tax credit for new vaccines that would match each
dollar of vaccine sales with a dollar of tax credits. This paper examines the rationale for such
proposals.
Private firms currently conduct little research on vaccines against malaria, tuberculosis, and
the strains of HIV common in Africa. This is not only because these diseases primarily affect poor
countries, but also because vaccines are subject to severe market failures. Once vaccine developers
have invested in developing vaccines, government are tempted to use their powers as regulators,
major purchasers, and arbiters of intellectual property rights to force prices to levels that do not cover
research costs. Research on vaccines is an international public good, and none of the many small
countries that would benefit from a malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccine has an incentive to
encourage research by unilaterally offering to pay higher prices. In fact, most vaccines sold in
developing countries are priced at pennies per dose, a tiny fraction of their social value. More
expensive, on-patent vaccines are typically not purchased by the poorest countries. Hence, private
developers lack incentives to pursue socially valuable research opportunities. Large public purchases
could potentially enlarge the market for vaccines, benefiting both vaccine producers and the public
at large. Government-directed research programs may be well-suited for basic research, but for the
later, more applied stages of research, committing to compensate successful private vaccine
developers has important advantages. Under such programs, the public pays only if a successful
vaccine is actually developed. This gives pharmaceutical firms and scientists strong incentives to
self-select research projects that have a reasonable chance of leading to a vaccine, and to focus on
developing a viable vaccine rather than pursuing other goals.
Committing to purchase vaccines and make them available to poor countries may be
attractive relative to other ways of rewarding vaccine developers. Extending patents on other
pharmaceuticals to reward developers of new vaccines would place the entire burden of financing
vaccines on those needing these other pharmaceuticals.  Increasing prices for current vaccines without
explicit incentives for development of new vaccines would be insufficient to spur new research.
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Malaria, tuberculosis, and the strains of HIV prevalent in Africa kill almost five million
people each year.  Yet relative to this enormous burden, very little vaccine research is directed
towards these diseases.  Potential vaccine developers fear that they would not be able to sell
enough vaccine at a high enough price to recoup their research investments.  This is both because
these diseases primarily affect poor countries, and because vaccine markets are severely
distorted.  This paper examines the economic rationale for committing in advance to purchase
vaccines for these diseases.  Such commitments could create incentives for vaccine research and
help ensure that if vaccines were developed, poor countries could afford them.  Because a
vaccine purchase commitment would require no funds until a vaccine was available, it would not
compete with budgets for current efforts to control diseases using existing technology.
These issues are particularly timely.  The U.S. administration’s budget proposal
[http://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/library/grnbk00.pdf] includes $1 billion in tax credits over the
2002-2010 period for vaccine sales.  The program would match every dollar of qualifying
vaccine sales with a dollar of tax credit, effectively doubling the incentive to develop vaccines
for neglected diseases.  Qualifying vaccines would have to cover infectious diseases which kill at
least one million people each year, would have to be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and would have to be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury after
advice from the U.S. Agency for International Development.  To qualify for the tax credit, sales
would have to be made to approved purchasing institutions, such as the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  Although the administration’s proposal is structured as a tax credit,
it would have effects similar to an expenditure program that matched private funds spent on
vaccines.Introduction 2
The World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, recently said that the institution plans to
create a $1 billion fund to help countries purchase specified vaccines if and when they are
developed [Financial Times, 2000].  Wolfensohn's proposal is being discussed within the Bank
and would have to be approved by the Bank's board.  One option under consideration is a more
general program to combat communicable diseases of the poor.  For a general program to
stimulate research, it must include an explicit commitment to help finance the purchase of new
vaccines if and when they are developed.  Without an explicit commitment along the lines
proposed by Wolfensohn, it is unlikely that the large scale investments needed to develop
vaccines will be undertaken.
The concept of a vaccine purchase fund has also received support from European
political leaders [http://www.auswartiges.amt.de, 1999].
Section 1 of this paper provides background information on malaria, HIV, and
tuberculosis; discusses the prospects for vaccines for these diseases; and reviews the current state
of scientific progress towards vaccine development.
Section 2 discusses distortions in the market for vaccines and for vaccine research.
People tend to underconsume vaccines for a number of reasons.  First, individuals have
inadequate incentives to take vaccines, since those who take vaccines not only benefit
themselves, but also benefit others by breaking the cycle of infection.  Second, the chief
beneficiaries of vaccination are often children, who cannot contract to pay vaccine sellers the
future earnings they will reap if they take vaccines and stay healthy.  Third, consumers are often
more willing to pay for treatment than prevention, perhaps because it takes time for them to learn
about the effectiveness of vaccines.  Monopoly pricing further limits access to patented vaccines.
Perhaps because of these factors, most countries purchase vaccines in bulk and distribute them atIntroduction 3
subsidized rates.  At appropriate prices, these large public purchases could potentially make both
vaccine producers and the population at large better off than they would be under monopoly
pricing by reducing the cost per dose and expanding the market.
Distortions in the market for vaccine research are even greater than those for vaccines
themselves.  Rough calculations suggest that the social benefits of malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV
vaccines may easily exceed the returns to a private developer by a factor of ten or more, so
vaccine developers will lack incentives to pursue socially valuable research opportunities.
Research incentives are too small in many fields, but the situation is particularly problematic for
vaccines and is dire for vaccines against diseases which primarily affect poor countries.  It is
often possible to design around vaccine patents, and since vaccines are primarily sold to
governments, brand loyalty provides minimal benefit to the original developer.  Once developers
have sunk resources into developing vaccines, governments are often tempted to use their powers
as regulators, major purchasers, and arbiters of intellectual property rights to obtain vaccines at
prices which cover only manufacturing costs, not research costs.  Since research and
development on vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV is a global public good that benefits
many small countries, no single country has an incentive to encourage research by offering
higher prices, and hence many countries have historically provided little or no intellectual
property rights protection to vaccines.  Most vaccines sold in developing countries sell for
pennies per dose, and newer, on-patent, vaccines, which sell for a dollar or two per dose, do not
reach the poorest countries.  Crude calculations suggest that a malaria vaccine would be cost-
effective relative to other developing country health programs at $41 per person immunized.
The gap between the $41 at which a vaccine would be cost-effective and the $2 which the
historical record suggests a vaccine developer would be likely to obtain for a vaccine implies thatIntroduction 4
under current institutions, potential vaccine developers would not have incentives to pursue
socially valuable research opportunities.
Section 3 examines the appropriate roles of “push” and “pull” programs in encouraging
vaccine research and improving access to vaccines once they are developed.  “Push” programs
pay for research inputs, for example through grants to researchers, while “pull” programs pay for
an actual vaccine.  Push programs are well suited to financing basic research, because it is
important that the results of basic research are quickly communicated to other scientists.  Grant-
funded researchers have incentives to publish quickly, while researchers with strong financial
incentives to develop a vaccine might wish to withhold information from competitors.
Historically, however, governments have relied heavily on push programs to encourage even the
later, more applied stages of vaccine development, in part because it was thought necessary to
finance research expenditures in advance of the development of a vaccine.  With the
development of the biotech industry and the increased availability of finance from venture
capitalists and large pharmaceutical firms, it is now much easier for scientists to attract investors
to finance research, as long as a substantial market is expected for the product.
Pull programs can provide such a market, and they have several attractive features
relative to traditional push programs for encouraging the later stages of vaccine development.
Under pull programs, the public pays nothing unless a viable vaccine is developed.  This gives
researchers incentives to self-select projects with a reasonable chance of yielding a viable
vaccine, rather than to oversell their research prospects to research administrators and the public.
It allows politicians and the public to be confident that they are paying for an actual vaccine,
rather than supporting a vaccine-development effort that might not be warranted scientifically.
Pull programs also provide strong financial incentives for researchers to focus on developing aIntroduction 5
marketable vaccine, rather than pursuing other goals, such as publishing academic articles.
Finally, pull programs can help ensure that if vaccines are developed, they will reach those who
need them.
Section 4 compares a vaccine purchase commitment program to other pull programs
designed to increase incentives for vaccine research.  Rewarding vaccine developers with
extensions of patents on other pharmaceuticals would inefficiently and inequitably place the
entire burden of financing vaccine development on patients who need these other
pharmaceuticals.  Cash prizes for research are economically similar to a vaccine purchase
program, but provide a somewhat weaker link between vaccine quality and the compensation
paid to vaccine developers.  They are also likely to be politically less attractive and therefore less
credible to potential vaccine developers.  Encouraging vaccine development through research
tournaments is likely to be difficult, since there is no guarantee that a vaccine could be developed
within a fixed time period.  While expanded purchases and deliveries of currently underutilized
vaccines would be highly cost-effective health interventions in their own right, such purchases
are unlikely on their own to convince potential developers of vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis,
or clades of HIV common in Africa that historically fickle international aid donors will provide
funds to purchase vaccines for these diseases ten or fifteen years from now.  Explicit purchase
commitments would also be needed.
A companion paper, “Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part II: Design Issues,”
discusses how commitments to purchase vaccines could be structured.
This paper builds on previous literature.  The idea of committing to purchase vaccines
was discussed in WHO [1996] and was advocated by a coalition of organizations coordinated by
the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative at the 1997 Denver G8 summit.  Since then, the ideaIntroduction 6
has been explored by the World Bank AIDS Vaccine Task Force [World Bank, 1999 and 2000].
Kremer and Sachs [1999] and Sachs [1999] have advocated the establishment of a program in
the popular press.  This paper also draws on earlier work on vaccines, including Batson [1999],
Dupuy and Freidel [1990], Mercer Management Consulting [1998], and Milstien and Batson
[1994], and on the broader academic literature on research incentives, including Guell and
Fischbaum [1995], Johnston and Zeckhauser [1991], Lanjouw and Cockburn [1999], Lichtmann
[1997], Russell [1998], Scotchmer [1997], Shavell and van Ypserle [1998], and Wright [1983].
This paper differs from some of the earlier work mentioned in examining the case for
commitments to purchase vaccines in light of the underlying economic principles of asymmetric
information and time consistency.  In particular, this paper argues that information asymmetries
between funders and researchers may hamper programs which fund researchers in advance.  The
time-inconsistent preferences of governments imply that in the absence of specific commitments
general statements of intent to purchase vaccines will not be credible.  This paper also differs
from earlier work in comparing commitments to purchase vaccines to other pull programs.
1.  Background on Malaria, HIV, and Tuberculosis
This section reviews the burden of the major infectious diseases, discusses scientific
prospects for vaccines, and argues that current research efforts are paltry relative to the burden
these diseases impose.
1.1.  The Burden of Malaria, HIV/AIDS, and TuberculosisSection 1: Background 7
Estimates of the burden of infectious disease vary widely, but it is clear that the burden is
huge.  The World Health Organization estimates that each year there are 300 million clinical
cases of malaria and 1.1 million deaths from malaria.  Almost all cases are in developing
countries, and almost 90% are in Africa [WHO, 1999a].  Malaria is particularly likely to kill
children and pregnant women.  Resistance is spreading to the major drugs used for treating
malaria and for providing short-term protection to travelers [Cowman, 1995].
Each year, approximately 1.9 million people die from tuberculosis.  More than 98 percent
of these deaths occur in developing countries [WHO, 1999a].  However, with up to 17 percent of
tuberculosis infections resistant to all five major anti-tubercular drugs, the spread of resistance
poses a threat to developed as well as developing countries [WHO, 1997].  The existing BCG
vaccine, which is distributed widely, provides short-run, imperfect protection against
tuberculosis, but a more effective vaccine, providing longer-term protection, is lacking.
1
More than 33 million people are infected with HIV worldwide, over 95% of whom live in
developing countries.  In 1998, about 2.3 million people died of AIDS, 80% of whom lived in
sub-Saharan Africa.  Approximately 5.8 million people were newly infected, 70% of whom were
in sub-Saharan Africa [WHO, 1999a; UNAIDS, 1998].  New life-extending HIV treatments are
far too expensive for most individuals and governments in low-income countries.  Since people
with compromised immune systems are especially vulnerable to tuberculosis, the spread of HIV
is contributing to the spread of tuberculosis.  Indeed, of the 1.9 million people who die annually
from tuberculosis, 400,000 are infected with HIV.
                                               
1 The vaccine has been much more effective in some trials than others: trials in Britain suggest effectiveness up to
80%, while those in the southern United States and southern India suggest close to zero effectiveness.Section 1: Background 8
1.2.  The Potential for Vaccines
Vaccines have proved effective against many other infectious diseases, and in the long
run, they are likely to be the most effective and sustainable way to fight malaria, tuberculosis,
and HIV/AIDS.  The potential of vaccines is illustrated most vividly by the success of the
smallpox vaccination program, which led to the eradication of the disease in the 1970s.  About
three-quarters of the world’s children receive a standard package of cheap, off-patent vaccines
through WHO’s Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), and these vaccines are estimated to
save 3 million lives per year [Kim-Farley, 1990].
2  However, only a small fraction of children in
poor countries receive newer vaccines, such as the Haemophilus influenzae b (Hib) vaccine,
which are still on patent and hence more expensive.
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), with major financing from
the Gates Foundation, is undertaking a large-scale effort to improve utilization of existing
vaccines.  This effort is likely to raise coverage rates and save millions of lives.  Coverage rates
would likely be further increased if effective vaccines were available against malaria,
tuberculosis, or HIV/AIDS, since governments would then have greater incentives to maintain
their immunization infrastructure, and parents would have more incentive to bring their children
in for vaccination.  Even if malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines only achieved the same
coverage rates as the inexpensive EPI vaccines, they would still save millions of lives.
The question of whether vaccines can be developed against malaria, tuberculosis, and
HIV remains open, but there is reason to be optimistic.  A recent National Academy of Sciences
report [1996] concludes that the development of a malaria vaccine is scientifically feasible.
                                               
2 Vaccination rates are uneven around the world, but the 74% worldwide vaccination rate does not just reflect rich
country experience: of the 118 million children born each year, 107 million are born in developing countries.Section 1: Background 9
Candidate vaccines have been shown to protect against malaria in several rodent and primate
models.  Moreover, the human immune system can be primed against natural malaria infection.
People who survive beyond childhood in malaria endemic areas obtain limited immunity which
protects them against severe malaria, although not against parasitemia and milder illness.  Since
vaccines prime the immune system by mimicking natural infection, vaccines may similarly
provide protection against severe disease.  Recently, candidate vaccines have been shown to
induce protection against tuberculosis infection in animal models.  The example of the existing
BCG vaccine suggests that the human immune system can be primed against tuberculosis
infection.  A number of candidate HIV vaccines protect monkeys against infection and induce
immune responses in humans.
Nonetheless, formidable scientific and technological obstacles remain in the way of
development of malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV vaccines.  All three diseases have many variants
and evolve rapidly, making it difficult to design vaccines which are effective against all variants
of the disease and which remain effective over time.
Recent advances in immunology, biochemistry, and cloning have given scientists new
tools to understand the immune response to these diseases, find correlates of protection useful in
testing whether candidate vaccines are likely to succeed, and develop better animal models.
Genetic sequencing of the organisms causing tuberculosis, AIDS, and malaria is either complete
or far advanced.  This may help scientists create vaccines which target many different antigens,
and thus are more effective in the face of genetic diversity.
1.3.  Current Vaccine ResearchSection 1: Background 10
Despite the increasing scientific potential, current research on vaccines for malaria,
tuberculosis, and HIV is paltry relative to the burden of these diseases.  According to a
Wellcome Trust study, public and non-profit malaria research amounted to about $84 million in
1993, with vaccine research making up only a small fraction of the total [Wellcome Trust, 1996].
The amount of private sector spending on malaria is unknown, but is generally considered to be
far lower than public spending.  Less is known about total expenditures on tuberculosis research,
but the United States National Institutes of Health, one of the world’s leading funders of basic
research, spends around $65 million per year on tuberculosis research, compared with $2.7
billion on cancer research [NIH, 1999].
Applied AIDS research is overwhelmingly oriented towards treatments which would be
appropriate for people with AIDS in rich countries, rather than towards vaccines appropriate for
poorer countries.  The multi-drug treatments for HIV are not feasible for poor countries, since
they cost $10,000-16,000 a year [PhRMA, 1999], require ongoing immune monitoring, and need
to be taken in perpetuity according to a precise protocol.  To the extent that vaccine research is
conducted, it is primarily oriented towards the HIV strains common in rich countries.  Most
candidate HIV vaccines tested worldwide are based on clade E, the strain of the virus most
widespread in the United States, Europe, Australia, and Latin America, rather than the clades
most common in Africa, where two-thirds of new infections occur.  It is uncertain whether a
vaccine developed for one clade would protect against other clades.
More generally, little research is oriented toward tropical diseases.  Pecoul et al. [1999]
report that of the 1,233 drugs licensed worldwide between 1975 and 1997, only 13 were for
tropical diseases.  Two of these were modifications of existing medicines, two were produced for
the U.S. military, and five came from veterinary research.  Only four were developed bySection 1: Background 11
commercial pharmaceutical firms specifically for tropical diseases of humans.  (Note, however,
that the definition of tropical disease used in their assessment was narrow, and that many of the
other drugs licensed in this period were useful in both developing and developed countries.)
2. Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research
One reason for the paucity of research on vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and clades of
HIV common in Africa is simply that the countries affected by these diseases are poor, and
cannot afford to pay much for vaccines.  If this were the only reason, however, there would be no
particular reason to target aid expenditures to vaccines or vaccine research, rather than to other
goods needed in poor countries, such as food and shelter.  In fact, however, distortions in the
markets for vaccines lead them to be underconsumed even relative to the incomes of the poor.
Even more severe distortions in the research market eliminate incentives for private firms to
conduct vaccine research that would be cost-effective for society as a whole, even by the
stringent cost-effectiveness standards used to evaluate health interventions in poor countries.
Sub-section 2.1 argues that vaccines are underconsumed and that large public purchases
can potentially make both vaccine producers and consumers better off than they would be under
monopoly pricing.  Sub-section 2.2 argues that under current institutions, private returns to
research are limited by the ease of designing around patents and by temptations for governments
to hold down vaccine prices once vaccines have been developed.  Sub-section 2.3 reports a rough
calculation suggesting that vaccines would be cost-effective health interventions for poor
countries at prices ten or twenty times as much as vaccine developers could hope to realize fromSection 2: Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research 12
their work.  Thus, under current institutional arrangements, private developers will lack
incentives to pursue socially valuable research opportunities.
2.1.  Failures in the Market for Vaccines
Vaccines are underconsumed for a variety of reasons.  First, individuals who take
vaccines not only benefit themselves, but also help break the chain of disease transmission, thus
benefiting the rest of the population.  Individuals have no incentive to take these external benefits
into account in deciding whether to be vaccinated.  Second, the chief beneficiaries of vaccines
are often children.  Even if the cost of vaccination is trivial relative to the extra future wages
children will earn if they stay healthy, children cannot contract to pay for vaccination out of
those future wages.  Third, consumers seem much more willing to pay for treatment than
prevention.  Many potential consumers in developing countries are illiterate and place limited
credence in official pronouncements about the benefits of vaccination.  They may wait to see
these benefits by observing what happens to neighbors who take vaccines.  However, the benefits
of vaccines, unlike those of drugs for treating diseases, are difficult to see, since the benefits of
vaccines are not evident until considerably after vaccines are taken, and many people who do not
take vaccines never get sick.
Monopoly pricing of vaccines would exacerbate underconsumption of vaccines.  This
may explain why governments in the vast majority of countries purchase vaccines and distribute
them to the population either free or at a highly subsidized price.  Because vaccine development
is expensive, but manufacturing additional doses of vaccine is typically cheap, large government
purchases can potentially make both vaccine producers and the general public better off thanSection 2: Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research 13
they would be under monopoly pricing to individuals.  This can be achieved by purchasing a
large quantity of the vaccine at a lower price per dose than under monopoly pricing to
individuals.  The vaccine developer can be made better off if the total value of their sales (price
times quantity) is higher than it would be under sales to individuals.  Those consumers who
would have been willing to pay the monopoly price are better off, as long as the taxes they would
have to pay to finance government vaccine purchases are less than the monopoly price.  The
consumers who valued the vaccine at more than the production cost but less than the monopoly
price can also be made better off, as long as the value they place on the vaccine is greater than
the increase in taxes necessary to finance government purchases.
Figure 1 shows a situation in which government purchases can potentially make everyone
better off than under monopoly pricing.  The downward-sloping line shows the willingness to
pay of different potential consumers for the vaccine, which depends on their income.  The lower
horizontal line represents the cost of producing an additional dose of the vaccine once the
research costs have been incurred and the factory has been built.  A monopolist will choose a
price to maximize profits.  Area A represents the surplus of revenue over marginal
manufacturing costs under monopoly pricing.  These funds can be used to cover the costs of
research and development on the vaccine, the costs of building the factory, and any profits.  Note
that many people who are not willing to buy the vaccine at the monopoly price would be willing
to pay more than the amount it costs to produce an additional dose of vaccine.Section 2: Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research 14
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To see why large government purchases that expand the market and bring down the
average cost per dose may potentially be able to make everybody better off, suppose that the
government agrees to pay the vaccine manufacturer an amount equal to the sum of areas A, B, C,
and D in exchange for enough vaccines for the entire population.  If these purchases are funded
by taxing people based on their income, with all people who would have paid the monopoly
price paying just under that price, and all other people paying just over the actual production
cost
3, vaccine producers and the general public will both be better off than under monopoly
pricing.
45  Areas D and E represent the social benefit of the vaccine purchase program.
Note that while large government purchases could potentially make both consumers and
producers better off, if governments force prices too low, they risk making vaccine developers
worse off than under a private market system, thus discouraging research.
                                               
3 Pharmaceutical manufacturers may try to sell the vaccine to different customers at different prices.  However, the
ability of pharmaceutical manufacturers to discriminate between customers in this way is limited, because all
customers will try to obtain the vaccine at the lower price.  The government has the power to tax higher income
earners at a higher rate.  Pharmaceutical manufacturers may to come up with crude income indicators, for example
by selling at a discount to groups of hospitals, but they have less scope to vary prices with income than the
government does to vary taxes with income.
4 Note that if the willingness to pay for vaccines depends on factors other than income, then tax-financed
government vaccine purchases may not make literally everyone better off, because some people may not want to
take the vaccine at any price.  To see this, it is useful to consider the cases of malaria and HIV.  If a safe, cheap, and
effective malaria vaccine were developed, almost everyone living in areas with malaria would presumably want to
purchase it.  On the other hand, some people might not want to take an AIDS vaccine, even if it were free, because
they believe that they have a very low chance of contracting the disease.  Since taxes would presumably fall equally
on people with a low and a high risk of contracting AIDS, large government purchases of an AIDS vaccine might
not literally make everyone better off.  The willingness of people in low-risk groups to pay for the vaccine might be
less than the increase in their taxes necessary to pay for vaccine purchases.
5As discussed in a companion paper, “Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part II: Design Issues”, government
purchase and distribution of products with large development costs but low manufacturing costs involves its own
difficulties.  Hence, governments do not purchase and distribute all such products.  However, purchasing vaccines is
likely to be much easier than purchasing other goods, such as CDs.  It is difficult for the government to specify what
characteristics a CD would need to be eligible for purchase, or how much to pay CD producers as a function of CD
quality.  Specifying eligibility and pricing rules for vaccines is easier, albeit far from trivial.Section 2: Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research 16
2.2.  Failures in the Market for Vaccine Research
Economists have estimated that the social returns to research and development are
typically twice the returns to private developers [Nadiri, 1993; Mansfield et al., 1977].  Private
developers therefore lack incentives to pursue research on socially valuable projects.  The gap
between private and social returns to research is likely to be much greater for research on
malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV vaccines than in many other areas of applied research.
This is because it is often possible to design around vaccine patents and because governments are
often tempted to use their powers as regulators and large purchasers to hold down vaccine prices
after firms have sunk their research investments and developed a vaccine.  Because vaccine
research is a global public good benefiting many small countries, no single country has an
incentive to pay higher vaccine prices to encourage research.
It is often possible to design around vaccine patents, and this may make it difficult for the
original developers of new vaccines to recoup their research expenditures.  Once they have
invested millions in a risky effort to develop new vaccines, competitors may be able to slightly
alter their approach so as to develop a competing vaccine, driving down prices.  In many
industries, first-mover advantages are often as important as patents in spurring innovation.
However, governments and international organizations purchase most vaccines, and these
institutions are not particularly subject to brand loyalty.
Vaccine research is subject to what economists call a “time-consistency” problem.
Vaccine research is very expensive, but once vaccines have been invented, they can usually be
manufactured at low cost.
6  Once a vaccine has been developed, even a public-spirited
                                               
6 Note, however, that new vaccines, particularly those based on conjugate technology, are likely to have somewhat
greater manufacturing costs than traditional vaccines.Section 2: Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research 17
government may be tempted to try to obtain vaccines at a price that would cover manufacturing
costs but not research costs.  Governments are in a strong bargaining position at this point
because they are major vaccine purchasers, they regulate vaccines, and they are arbiters of
intellectual property rights.  Governments and international organizations therefore can, and do,
bargain for very low prices.  Thus, while in theory government purchases of vaccines could
make both vaccine producers and consumers better off, in practice they are often used as a
vehicle to transfer wealth from vaccine producers to consumers.
7  Since potential researchers
anticipate this redistribution, they invest less in research than they otherwise would.
The time-consistency problem that leads governments to pay low prices for vaccines is
exacerbated by political problems in many developing countries that make vaccines a low
political priority.  In particular, since vaccines deliver a widely distributed benefit, they tend to
receive less political support than expenditures which benefit more concentrated and politically
organized groups, including salaries for health workers.
Moreover, vaccine research and development is a global public good, so each country has
an incentive to free ride off research financed by other countries’ governments or induced by
their intellectual property rights protection.  A large country, such as the United States, would
know that if it did this, it would risk cutting off the flow of future research.  Small countries,
such as Uganda, can assume that individually their actions will have little effect on total research
incentives.  However, if all African countries act this way, there will be little incentive for
development of a malaria vaccine.
This free-riding problem is particularly severe for countries that are only a small fraction
of the world market and hence reap only a small fraction of the worldwide benefits of research.
                                               
7 Large liability awards can also be interpreted as a way that governments extract resources from vaccine
developers.Section 2: Failures in the Markets for Vaccines and Vaccine Research 18
Pharmaceutical prices are controlled at prices approximately one half of United States levels in
the European Union, while in Japan, they are controlled at one quarter of U. S. levels [Robbins
and Freeman, 1988].  The world’s three leading infectious diseases affect many small developing
countries, which have even less reason to internalize the benefits of drug development than the
European Union or Japan.
8
Historically, developing countries have not provided much protection for intellectual
property rights for pharmaceuticals.  Until recently, many developing countries did not grant
patent protection for pharmaceuticals and thereby kept prices low [Siebeck, 1990].  Several
developing countries, including India and Brazil, have recently agreed to enhance intellectual
property rights for pharmaceuticals, but only under intense trade pressure from the United States.
It remains to be seen whether the promised intellectual property rights policies will be enforced.
Many pharmaceutical firms are skeptical.  The South African government recently announced
that it may attempt to force patent holders on AIDS drugs to license their patents to generic
manufacturers.  The United States initially opposed this, but abandoned its opposition in
response to a storm of protest.  Given the huge importance of an HIV or malaria vaccine to many
developing countries, it is far from clear that the U.S. could induce developing countries to
establish strong intellectual property rights for such vaccines, short of offering to pay for the
additional costs this would impose on the countries.
Research on vaccines for diseases prevalent in both developed and developing countries
has been stimulated by demand in developed countries.  However, the limited intellectual
                                               
8 Data on the distribution of burden of disease by country is limited, but some rough calculations suggest that the
share of the worldwide disease burden in the country with the greatest burden ranges from 14% and 18% for HIV
and malaria respectively, which disproportionately affect Africa, to 25% for tuberculosis, which is a big problem
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property rights available in many poor countries deter research on vaccines against diseases such
as malaria, which would have little market in developed countries.
Note that even if intellectual property rights were enforced globally, the same arguments
which suggest that national vaccine purchases are more efficient than individual purchases would
also suggest that international purchases are potentially more efficient than national purchases.
If vaccine developers charge a single monopoly price to governments, some countries will not be
able to afford to purchase the vaccine.  All countries could potentially be made better off, as long
as the rich countries paid no more than the monopoly price they would have paid otherwise, and
the poor countries pay less than the amount at which they value the vaccine, but more than the
actual production cost.  Note also that even if poor countries could somehow be induced to
establish strong intellectual property rights for vaccine developers, they would still have market
power as purchasers, and hence would still likely be able to negotiate a price below the full
social value of vaccines.  Hence research and development incentives would likely be too small
even in this case.
The market could reach efficient size if vaccine developers charged each nation a
separate price based on what they were willing to pay, through a system of tiered pricing.  In
fact, pharmaceutical firms do charge different prices to different countries.  However,
opportunities for tiered pricing are limited, partly by the possibility of resale, but primarily by
fear of a political backlash in rich countries.  Politically, it is difficult for pharmaceutical firms to
justify charging much higher prices in one country than in another.  For example, after a
Congressional hearing in which Senator Paula Hawkins asked a major vaccine manufacturer how
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as to foreign countries, U.S. manufacturers stopped submitting bids to UNICEF to supply
vaccines.
9
One way to achieve some of the same objectives as tiered pricing would be to purchase
vaccines internationally for a range of poor countries at a single price and then collect co-
payments from these countries that would vary with their incomes.  This approach would
increase access to vaccines, while ensuring that richer countries, which have greater willingness
to pay for vaccines, contribute more towards covering the costs of vaccine research and
development.  The embarrassment of charging many different prices to different countries would
be avoided.  This approach would, however, require outside funding to make up the difference
between the price at which vaccines are purchased from manufacturers and the co-payments
received from the poorest countries.
2.3.  Social vs. Private Return: Some Quantitative Estimates
A crude preliminary estimate suggests that the social benefits of vaccines may be ten to
twenty times the private benefits appropriated by vaccine developers.  Since potential vaccine
developers will consider only private returns in setting their research budgets, incentives for
vaccine research are almost certainly far too small.
Consider the potential benefits from a hypothetical 80 percent effective one-dose malaria
vaccine.  A standard way to assess the cost-effectiveness of a health intervention is the cost per
Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) saved.  In its 1993 World Development Report, the
                                               
9 When President Clinton announced his childhood immunization initiative in 1993, he said, “I cannot believe that
anyone seriously believes that America should manufacture vaccines for the world, sell them cheaper in foreign
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World Bank defined health interventions as “highly cost-effective” for poor countries if they cost
less than $100 per DALY saved.  (In contrast, health interventions are considered cost-effective
in the U.S. at up to 500 to 1000 times this amount – $50,000-$100,000 per year of life saved
[Neumann et al., 2000].)  The WHO recently estimated that malaria costs 39.3 million DALYs
per year [WHO, 1999a].
Malaria is particularly deadly in children under five, who have not yet developed limited
natural immunity, and women pregnant with their first child, whose immune systems are
suppressed.  The target population for a malaria vaccine would be the roughly 50 million
children born annually in low-income and lower-middle-income countries with high enough
prevalence to make vaccination cost-effective and approximately 10 million women pregnant
with their first child living in countries with high enough prevalence to make vaccination of this
group cost effective.
10  We assume that 75% of targeted children and 50% of targeted first-time
mothers are reached, so that 42.1 million people are immunized annually.  Incremental delivery
costs for adding a single-dose childhood to the EPI package might be about $1.00 per child
vaccinated.
11  The marginal cost of delivery for pregnant women might be closer to $3.00 per
woman vaccinated.  A rough calculation suggests that delivery of such a vaccine would save
17.6 million DALYs each year and would cost $52.2 million annually for a delivery cost of
about $2.97 per DALY saved.  This implies that at a cost-effectiveness threshold of $100 per
DALY, an 80% effective malaria vaccine would be cost-effective even at a price of $41 per
immunized person, or a total or $.17 billion annually to immunize 42.1 million people.
12  Note
                                               
10 Existing cohorts of children younger than five might also be vaccinated, but since this is a one-time occurrence, it
is ignored in this calculation.
11 The addition of both the hepatitis B and the yellow fever vaccines (which are relatively expensive) to the WHO’s
Expanded Program of Immunization increased the $15 cost of the program by 15%, or $2.25, including both
manufacturing and distribution costs.
12 To see this, note that 17.6 million DALYs x $100/DALY = $1.76 billion = $52.2 million in delivery costs + $41
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that these figures do not take into account knock-on reductions in secondary infections or the
potential economic benefits of reducing malaria prevalence beyond the impact on the individual
suffering from the disease.
13  (See Appendix 2 of the companion paper, “Creating New Markets
for Vaccines: Part II: Design Issues,” for more detailed calculations of vaccine cost
effectiveness.)
These calculations imply that from the standpoint of society as a whole, it would be cost-
effective for private developers to conduct research leading to a malaria vaccine, even if the
research were risky and expensive enough that the developer would have to charge $41 per
immunized person, or $1.7 billion annually, in perpetuity, to recoup the research costs and the
risk of failure.  However, such a research investment would not be cost-effective from the
standpoint of a private developer.  To give some indication of this, the total developing country
market for childhood vaccines is $200 million annually [World Bank AIDS Vaccine Task Force,
2000].  The combined cost of the six vaccines in the standard Expanded Program on
Immunization (EPI) package is about $0.50 [Robbins and Freeman, 1988].  Of course, a vaccine
under patent would likely generate greater revenues than off-patent vaccines.  However, when
the hepatitis B vaccine was first introduced and priced at $30 per dose, it was used infrequently
in developing countries [Muraskin 1995; Galambos 1995].
14  Even at a dollar or two per dose,
hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenzae b vaccines do not reach most children in the poorest
countries [General Accounting Office, 1999].  It seems likely that the developer of a malaria
vaccine would receive payments worth less than one-tenth or one-twentieth of the $41 per
immunized person at which vaccines would be cost effective.  The huge disparity between
                                               
13 Gallup and Sachs [2000] use a cross-country regression approach to estimate that countries with severe malaria
grew 1.3% less per year than those without malaria.  It is difficult to know the portion of this statistical relationship
which is causal.
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private incentives to invest in research and the social benefits of a vaccine suggests that research
investment will be far too little in the absence of public support.
To summarize, vaccine research is an international public good, since efforts by one
country to develop a malaria vaccine will benefit others as well.  Once vaccines are developed,
governments may be tempted not to compensate vaccine developers for their research
expenditures, so potential developers will not invest in research without credible commitments
that they will be paid.  A rough quantitative estimate suggests that vaccine developers will lack
incentive to pursue malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV vaccine research, even if this research would
be extremely cost-effective for society as a whole.  These factors suggest that encouraging
vaccine research may be very cost-effective relative to existing forms of development assistance
which do not particularly target global public goods.  The next two sections discuss alternative
ways to promote vaccine research.
                                                                                                                                                      
vaccine developer would be far less than the social benefit.
3.  The Roles of Push and Pull Programs in Encouraging Vaccine Research
The literature on vaccine research distinguishes between “push” and “pull” programs.
Push programs provide funding for vaccine research, for example through grants to academics,
public equity investments in vaccine development, research and development tax credits, or work
in government laboratories.  Pull programs increase rewards for development of a vaccine, for
example by promising to purchase a vaccine if it is developed.  Roughly, the distinction is
between paying for research inputs and paying for research outputs.  Sub-section 3.1 argues that
pull programs are well-suited to the later stages of the vaccine development process, andSection 3: The Roles of Push and Pull Programs 24
discusses some of the problems with push programs, as illustrated by the history of USAID’s
push program to develop a malaria vaccine.  Sub-section 3.2 argues that push programs are well-
suited to financing basic research, and discusses how push and pull programs can be combined.
3.1.  The Potential Role of Pull Programs
Historically, programs designed to encourage vaccine research financed research inputs
ahead of time rather than offering to pay for a vaccine.
15  This may have been in part because
there were relatively few sources of finance for commercial pharmaceutical research outside a
few major pharmaceutical companies.  However, the rise of the biotech industry, the availability
of venture capital, and the increased willingness and ability of large pharmaceutical firms to
contract with smaller firms and universities have made it much easier for researchers with
reasonable scientific prospects of developing a product to attract outside investors, as long as a
sufficient market is expected for the product.  Pull programs could create such a market.  It is
worth reevaluating methods of supporting research in light of this changed institutional
environment.
Under pull programs the government pays nothing unless a vaccine is developed.  This
creates strong incentives for researchers to 1) carefully select research projects and 2) focus on
developing viable vaccines, rather than pursuing other goals.
Perhaps the chief advantage of pull programs that provide strong financial incentives for
production of a vaccine is that they help in selecting research projects.  This is true both at the
                                               
15 Several vaccines were therefore developed primarily in the public sector, and only later licensed out to the private
sector for production.  For example, the meningococcal meningitis vaccine was developed almost entirely at the
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and a hepatitis B vaccine was designed by the Hepatitis B Task Force
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level of selecting individual research projects and at the level of determining whether a major
research effort on vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, or AIDS is scientifically warranted at all.
Researchers working on a particular line of research have an interest in exaggerating the promise
of their own lines of research.  Scientific administrators may have trouble deciding which
diseases are worth working on, and which vaccine approaches, if any, are worth pursuing.  They
may wind up financing ideas with only a minute probability of success, or worse, failing to fund
promising vaccine research because they do not have confidence that its backers are presenting
objective information on its prospects.
Public-sector equity investments in vaccine-development projects are subject to a similar
problem.  Firms which believe that they have identified projects with very high expected net
present value will be least inclined to seek public sector investments which would dilute their
equity stake, while those who are least confident about their research prospects will be most
inclined to seek outside equity investment.
Even if government-directed research programs manage to initially select appropriate
research projects, they are likely to fail to revise these judgements in light of later evidence.  If
results on a particular research project that initially appear promising later turn out to be
disappointing, a private firm is likely to shut the project down.  A public entity may acquire its
own bureaucratic momentum, leading governments to throw good money after bad.  Public
sector institutions are notoriously difficult to shut down.
The problem of selecting research projects exists not only on the level of deciding which
research avenues toward a particular vaccine are most promising, but also at the level of deciding
whether to expand vaccine research at all.  Section 2.3 argued that since vaccines would be cost-
effective at prices much greater than vaccines developers could hope to receive, private
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developers would have an incentive to pass up research opportunities that were cost-effective
from the standpoint of society as a whole.  This does not prove that such opportunities exist.
Elected officials and the public are likely to find it very difficult to assess the scientific
opportunities for research on malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS vaccines.  Under a system of
grant-financed research, advocates for particular diseases and scientists working on the disease
have an interest in exaggerating the opportunities.
While the gap between private and social incentives for vaccine development does not
prove that socially useful research opportunities exist, it does suggest a case for bringing private
and social incentives into line, so that private developers will have incentives to pursue any
socially desirable research investments that do exist.  A vaccine purchase commitment can do
this.  Since taxpayers pay nothing unless and until an effective vaccine is produced, elected
officials and the public do not have to worry that they are investing millions to develop a
technically infeasible vaccine.  Government officials do not have to decide between competing
scientific approaches.  Pharmaceutical firms contemplating pursuing a line of research and
scientists contemplating joining biotech ventures in exchange for stock options will invest their
money and time only if they believe the scientific prospects are promising.  Purchase
commitments have an advantage over research grants or equity investments precisely because the
scientific potential for vaccines is difficult for outsiders to assess.
In addition to allowing researchers to self-select promising projects, pull programs
encourage researchers to focus intently on developing a marketable vaccine, rather than on other
goals.  Many academic and government researchers have career incentives and intellectual
interests that orient them to fundamental science.  In contrast, the later, more applied stages of
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expensive.  Techniques for manufacturing sufficient quantities of candidate vaccines in sufficient
purity for clinical trials must be developed.  Animal models for the disease must be created.
Vaccine trials in the field must be conducted.  Nobody wins a Nobel Prize for these important
steps in vaccine development.  By linking payment to results, pull programs provide strong
incentives to researchers to concentrate their efforts on development of a vaccine.
16  Under a
system of grant-financed research it can be difficult to monitor that researchers are focusing on
development of a vaccine rather than publishing articles or applying for the next grant.
A similar monitoring problem arises when private research is subsidized through R & D
targeted tax credits.  Currently, U.S. companies are eligible for a 20% research and development
tax credit.  A bill recently introduced in the United States Congress proposes increasing this
credit to 30% for research on vaccines for diseases that kill more than one million people a year.
One potential problem with such an approach is that firms doing research with only indirect
implications for these diseases might try to claim eligibility for the credit, while focusing much
of their effort on developing more lucrative products.
17  In contrast, a tax credit linked to the sale
of a vaccine, such as that proposed in President Clinton's 2000 budget, does not face the same
monitoring problems.  This credit will only be awarded if a marketable vaccine is produced.
Another problem with push programs is that when governments directly allocate research
spending up front, they sometimes base decisions on political, rather than scientific,
considerations.  For example, there may be pressure to spend funds in particular congressional
districts.  The analogue for internationally supported research on malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV
is political pressure to allocate research expenditures to particular countries, developing countries
                                               
16 Of course to the extent that some of the work required to produce a vaccine is not so intellectually interesting,
scientists will need to be paid more to conduct this work [See Stern, 2000].
17 Another problem with the particular form of the research and development tax credit used in the United States is
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in particular.  With pull programs, in contrast, the sponsors promise to pay for a viable vaccine
wherever it is developed.
The risks that grant-funded scientists and research administrators competing for budgets
will overestimate the chances of success and divert resources away from vaccine research are far
from hypothetical.  Desowitz [1991] chronicles the sad story of the U.S. Agency for International
Development’s (USAID) 1980s push program to develop a malaria vaccine.  USAID’s efforts
focused on three teams.  A candidate vaccine was developed by the first team.  Tests with 9
volunteers found that only 2 were protected from malaria, and suggested that the vaccine created
side effects.  These results, mixed at best, did not prevent USAID from issuing wildly
overoptimistic statements.  In 1984, the agency claimed that there had been a “major
breakthrough in the development of a vaccine against the most deadly form of malaria in human
beings.  The vaccine should be ready for use around the world, especially in developing
countries, within five years.”
18 Fifteen years later, the world is still waiting for a malaria vaccine.
Early work by the second team yielded disappointing results, but not surprisingly, the
principal investigator argued that his approach was still worth pursing and requested an
additional $2.38 million from USAID.  The expert consultants assigned to review the project
recommended that the research not be funded.  However, USAID’s malaria vaccine project
director told the USAID Office of Procurement that the expert panel “had endorsed the scientific
methodology and the exceptional qualifications and experience of the researchers.”
19  Once the
grant came through, the principal investigator transferred grant funds to his personal account.  He
was later indicted for theft.
                                                                                                                                                      
high R&D expenditures [Hall, 1993].
18 All quotations are taken from Desowitz [1991], p. 255.
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The external evaluations of the third proposal called it mediocre and unrealistic.  The
USAID project director ignored the report and arranged for the project to be fully funded.  The
principal investigator and his administrative assistant were later indicted for theft and criminal
conspiracy in diverting money from the grant to their personal accounts.  Two months before his
arrest, the Rockefeller Foundation had provided him with a $750,000 research grant, and on the
very day that he was arrested, USAID announced it was giving him an additional $1.65 million
for research.
By 1986, USAID had spent over $60 million on its malaria vaccine efforts, with little
progress.  Since USAID believed that there would soon be many candidate malaria vaccines
suitable for testing, it tried to obtain monkeys as test subjects for these vaccines.  USAID’s
malaria vaccine project director, James Erickson, arranged for a contract to acquire monkeys to
go to an associate who paid him a kickback.  Erickson eventually pleaded guilty to accepting an
illegal gratuity, filing false tax returns, and making false statements.
What about outside oversight?  USAID had arranged for independent oversight to be
provided by the American Institute of Biological Science (AIBS).  Erickson and the AIBS-
assigned project manager were lovers.
The USAID case is extreme, and many push programs are quite successful.  But the
general principle remains that researchers funded under push programs have incentives to be
overoptimistic, and since they are paid before delivering a product, they may be tempted to
divert resources away from the search for a vaccine.
The USAID example may shed light on why the administrators of push programs and the
researchers financed by such programs often believe that push programs are somehow cheaper
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As a first approximation, a biotech or pharmaceutical firm will find it profitable to take
on a project if the probability of success times the net present value of profits if the project
succeeds exceeds the cost of undertaking the project.  This implies that even in the best case, if
the government funds only worthwhile research projects and researchers focus all their energies
on developing a vaccine, the expected discounted cost of developing a vaccine is likely to be
similar in net present value terms whether research is financed at the front end, through
government grants or induced by payments for a successful vaccine at the back end.
20  In the
more likely case, when research organizations are more careful in selecting projects and more
focused on developing vaccines if they are only paid if they succeed, private research is likely to
be more cost-effective than government programs.
Why then do many government scientists argue that push programs are cheaper than pull
programs?  The USAID example illustrates that researchers are prone to underestimate their
costs and overestimate their chance of success.  Of course, scientists in pharmaceutical firms do
the same.  But pharmaceutical executives and biotech investors anticipate this overoptimism, and
correct for it by requiring high projected hurdle rates before approving projects or investing
funds.
1  The net effect is that pharmaceutical executives and biotech investors wind up approving
projects that are likely to have positive net present value after correcting for the overoptimism of
project proponents.  It is misleading to compare the amounts government scientists claim they
would need to develop vaccines with the markets pharmaceutical executives claim they would
need to justify vaccine investments.
The analysis above is theoretical, but it is consistent with the empirical evidence, which
suggests that both government and private R & D have strong positive returns, but that the rate of
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return on private R & D is substantially greater [Nadiri, 1993; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; and
Bernstein and Nadiri, 1988, 1991].  The empirical record of government efforts to pick winners
in research and development of commercial products is littered with failures, from supersonic
transport to the breeder reactor to the Carter oil shale program.
In summary, while the case of USAID’s malaria vaccine program is extreme, and many
push programs are effective, push programs in general are vulnerable to overoptimism and
monitoring problems.  With pull programs, in contrast, biotech and pharmaceutical firms spend
their own money on research, and the public pays only if a vaccine is produced.
3.2.  Combining Push and Pull Programs
Although pull programs have an advantage in the later stages of development, push
programs are likely to be well-suited to financing basic research.  The main objective of basic
research, by definition, is to provide information to other researchers rather than to develop
products.  A program which ties incentives to the development of a product would encourage
researchers to keep their research results private as long as possible in order to have an advantage
in the next stage of research.  In contrast, grant-funded academics and scientists in government
laboratories have career incentives to publish their results quickly.  (One way around this would
be to link payment to research output, but it is difficult to measure the quality of basic research.
It is not simply a matter of testing if a vaccine works, or a product sells.)
Push programs also have some attractive features even for later stages of research.  To the
extent that intermediate steps in the vaccine research and development process create spillovers
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intermediate steps.  For example, milestone payments could be paid if efficacy were
demonstrated in animals.  However, milestone payments do not target the ultimate objective of a
vaccine, and hence might stimulate wasteful investments in research lines that were unlikely to
lead to a viable vaccine.  For example, researchers might try to demonstrate efficacy in animal
models for a vaccine that was unlikely to be safe in humans.  This problem is greater the larger
the milestone payment; if a milestone payment is greater than the cost of performing the
research, firms might find it profitable to reach the milestone even if they know they can go no
further.  Milestone payments will be less likely to stimulate wasteful research on candidates
unlikely to yield a viable vaccine if they are given in the form of subsidies for future research on
the candidate vaccine.
It is not clear whether the same body which administers a vaccine purchase commitment
program should also award milestone payments.  On the one hand, a track record of milestone
payments could help build credibility for a vaccine purchase commitment.  On the other hand, a
committee that had supported, or not supported, a line of research through milestone payments
might find it difficult to be objective in assessing eligibility and pricing for a vaccine purchase
commitment.
Push programs have other advantages.  Government programs that pay for research
whether it succeeds or fails transfer the risk of failure from the research firms’ shareholders to
society at large, and to the extent that shareholders cannot diversify risk in the stock market, this
risk-spreading is a potential advantage of push programs.  A number of theoretical models
suggest that private firms competing for a patent may inefficiently duplicate each other’s
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may lead to some duplication of effort, it also means that mistakes by a single decision-maker
will not block progress towards a vaccine.)
One of the biggest advantages of push programs relative to pull programs (other than
patents) is that they do not require specifying the output ahead of time.  A pull program could not
have been used to encourage the development of the Post-It Note
® or the graphical user interface,
because these products could not have been adequately described before they were invented.  In
contrast, it is comparatively easier to define what is meant by a safe and efficacious vaccine, and
existing institutions, such as the U.S. FDA, are already charged with making these
determinations.  As discussed in the companion paper, “Creating Markets for New Vaccines:
Design Issues,” even for vaccines, however, defining eligibility standards is far from trivial,
In general, society seems to prefer to use direct government support for basic research,
while using the promise of an exclusive market, rather than centralized government programs, to
stimulate the applied work of actual product development.  Applying the same principle to
vaccines would suggest using the promise of a market to encourage applied vaccine research.
Some push programs are already in place to spur vaccine research, although funding is
modest.  For example, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) supports AIDS vaccine
efforts.  In contrast, there are currently no programs in place to fully reward developers of viable
malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines.  If the already existing push programs were
complemented with pull programs, researchers would still have an incentive to pursue any
promising research leads that slip though the cracks of the push system.
If vaccine research were supported through a mix of push and pull programs, push
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rewarded through a pull program, or could condition public financing on agreement to supply the
vaccine to poor countries at a modest markup over manufacturing costs.
4. Alternative Pull Programs
Pull programs that reward successful vaccine research could take several different forms
other than commitments to purchase vaccines, including extensions of patent rights on other
products, cash prizes, research tournaments, and signaling willingness to pay more for future
vaccines by purchasing more existing vaccines at a higher price.
21  Given the huge disparities
between private and social returns to research, it is likely that any reasonable program to reward
vaccine developers would be cost-effective relative to the alternative of sticking with the status
quo.  However, this section argues that extensions of patent rights on other pharmaceuticals are
not the most efficient way to reward vaccine developers; that while cash prizes and commitments
to purchase vaccines are economically quite similar, purchase commitments are likely to be
somewhat more attractive politically, and thus more credible to potential vaccine developers; and
that research tournaments are inappropriate for situations like vaccine development, in which it is
possible that no satisfactory product will be created by a given date.  Purchasing and distributing
currently underutilized vaccines is certainly justified in its own right, but on its own is unlikely
to convince potential developers of vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, or strains of HIV common
                                               
21 In a previous paper [Kremer, 1998], I discuss the possibility of buying out patents, using an auction to establish
the patent’s value.  This can be seen as a method of determining the appropriate cash prize in lieu of a patent.  One
advantage of this approach is that it can be used even for inventions such as the Post-It® note, which could not be
defined ahead of time and which would be very hard to create even a semi-objective procedure for valuing.  On the
other hand, the auction procedure for valuing patents described in that paper may be subject to collusion.  For
products such as vaccines, which are comparatively easier to define ahead of time and for which it is comparatively
easy to evaluate effectiveness, advance purchase commitments may be just as effective as patent buyouts, and less
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in Africa that the international community will be willing to pay for these vaccines in ten or
fifteen years.
4.1 Patent Extensions
Jonathan Mann, the late founding director of the WHO Global Program on AIDS,
suggested compensating the developer of an HIV vaccine with a ten-year extension of patent
rights on another pharmaceutical.  With successful pharmaceuticals bringing in as much as $3.6
billion in annual sales [CNNfn, 1998] such a patent extension would be very valuable.  Patent
extensions may be politically appealing to advocates, in that they need not go through the budget
process.  However, they inefficiently and inequitably place the entire burden of financing
vaccine development on patients in need of the drug for which the patent has been extended.  To
see this, note that extending the patent on Prozac as compensation for developing an HIV
vaccine is economically equivalent to imposing a high tax on Prozac and using the proceeds to
finance cash compensation for the HIV vaccine developer.  High taxes on narrow bases are
typically an inefficient way of raising revenue, since they distort consumption away from the
taxed good.
22  An extension of the Prozac patent would prevent some people from getting needed
treatment for depression.
The potential countervailing advantage of patents is that when they are applied to the
invented good, they closely link the inventor’s compensation to the value of the invention, since
inventors will be able to charge more for valuable inventions.  If a vaccine is more effective,
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purchase pharmaceuticals, patents may be equivalent to a broad-based tax.  Nonetheless, patents may still be
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causes fewer side effects, and is easier to administer, it will bring in more revenue.  Patents
therefore create appropriate incentives for potential inventors.  However, rewarding the inventor
of an HIV vaccine with the extension of a Prozac patent eliminates this link between the
usefulness of the invention and the magnitude of the compensation.
Another disadvantage of compensating vaccine inventors with extensions of patents on
unrelated pharmaceuticals is that the right to extend a patent would be worth the most to firms
holding patents on commercially valuable pharmaceuticals, and these firms may not be those
with the best opportunities for vaccine research.  This problem would not be fully resolved by
making patent extensions tradable, since firms holding patents on commercially valuable
pharmaceuticals would presumably receive some profits in any such trades.  If vaccine
developers were compensated in cash, rather than patent extensions, they could receive the full
value of the compensation without sharing it with the holders of patents on unrelated
pharmaceuticals.
4.2 Cash Prizes
Cash prizes in lieu of patents are economically similar to purchase commitments.
However, purchase commitments more closely link payments to vaccine quality and are more
politically attractive, and hence more credible.  The disadvantages of government purchases are
likely to be minor for vaccines.
Compared to cash prizes in lieu of patents, vaccine purchases provide a closer link
between payments and vaccine quality.  For example, suppose that a vaccine received regulatory
                                                                                                                                                      
are less likely to do so than HMOs, and so patent extensions are more attractive in countries with centralized health
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approval, but was later found to have side effects.  If a cash prize had been awarded at the date of
regulatory approval, it might be difficult to get the money back.  Vaccine purchases, on the other
hand, could be suspended if countries wished to cease purchasing vaccines.
Moreover, purchase commitments are likely to be politically more attractive than cash
prizes, and thus more credible to potential vaccine developers.  Vaccine developers are
vulnerable to expropriation, even if the terms of the compensation program legally obligate the
government to provide compensation for any qualifying vaccine: the funds could be extracted
from them in a supposedly separate, unrelated action.  For example, a pharmaceutical firm that
had just earned a windfall on a malaria vaccine might be subject to stiff price regulation on
another product.  This suggests that it is important to design a compensation program in ways
that are as politically acceptable as possible, and that generate the minimum amount of
resentment.  Purchasing malaria vaccine for the 50 million children born in Africa each year at
$5 a dose for ten years is likely to be more politically appealing than awarding a $2.5 billion
prize to a pharmaceutical manufacturer.  Conversations with pharmaceutical executives suggest
that they do not like anything labeled as a prize.
Cash prizes in lieu of patents lead to free competition in manufacturing newly invented
goods, whereas public purchases require the government to specify details of the goods
purchased.  This would represent a significant advantage of prizes over purchases for most
goods, but it is less important for vaccines.  For example, if the government committed to
purchase high-definition television sets as a way of encouraging research, it would have to get
involved in decisions about screen size, color, style, reliability, and other issues best left to
consumers.  In contrast, governments regulate vaccine quality in any case.  Moreover, anSection 4: Alternative Pull Programs 38
effective malaria vaccine would be easy to allocate, since a single course would presumably be
taken by all children in malarious areas.
23
4.3 Tournaments
In research tournaments, the sponsor promises a reward to whoever has progressed the
farthest in research by a certain date.  (See [Taylor, 1995] for a discussion of tournaments.)  The
design competitions often used to select architectural firms are examples of tournaments.  In a
vaccine tournament, a committee might be established with instructions to award a cash prize to
whichever research team had made the most progress toward a vaccine as of a specific date.  If
no vaccine had been completed by that date, additional funds could be set aside for further
rounds of the tournament.
Tournaments have several limitations, however, and may not be appropriate for
encouraging vaccine research.
First, a payment must be made no matter what is developed.  While tournaments provide
incentives for researchers to devote effort to developing a product, they do not address the
problem of determining whether research on a particular vaccine is worth pursuing at all.
Advocates for a particular disease and scientists working on the disease will always want to
encourage the establishment of tournaments for research on their disease, even if the prospects
for ultimate success are low.  With a vaccine purchase program, nothing is spent unless a vaccine
is developed.
                                               
23 Note that many people are likely to live in areas where taking the vaccine is a borderline decision, and even in
these areas, the appropriateness of vaccination depends primarily on technical issues rather than personal
preferences.Section 4: Alternative Pull Programs 39
Another problem with tournaments is that once research has been completed, the award
committee might be tempted to allocate the reward on grounds other than progress in research.
The committee might award the reward to a more politically correct firm, to a university team, or
to whoever had done the most scientifically interesting work, rather than to the team which had
made the most progress toward a vaccine.  Anticipating this, firms might invest in political
correctness or scientific faddishness rather than in producing an effective vaccine.  Of course, a
committee making purchase decisions for a vaccine purchase program could also be subject to
bias, but judgments about who has made the most progress developing a vaccine are more
subjective than judgements about whether a vaccine with a particular set of results from phase III
trials are satisfactory.
Collusion among potential researchers may be particularly harmful in tournaments.  If
only a few pharmaceutical firms had done a significant amount of work, they could collude to
exert low effort on doing further research, since the reward would be paid whether or not a
vaccine was developed.
Tournaments may lead researchers to put their efforts into looking good on the
tournament completion date, rather than completing a vaccine.  Firms which discovered
promising research leads that were unlikely to yield solid results before the deadline might
ignore their leads, while firms that received information that the research line they were pursuing
would not yield a vaccine might not reveal this information.
Tournaments are also politically unattractive.  Governments may not find it politically
attractive to pay large amounts for research that may have not progressed very far.  Since there
would be no clear-cut way to decide who was ahead in research, awards might be subject to
litigation and charges of favoritism.Section 4: Alternative Pull Programs 40
Finally, rewards in tournaments would have to be in cash, rather than in guaranteed sales,
since no vaccine may have been developed by the end of the tournament.  As noted earlier,
however, cash rewards are less politically attractive than guaranteed markets.
4.4 Expanding the Market for Existing Vaccines
Some argue that by purchasing more existing vaccines at higher prices, policy makers can
signal their intention to provide a market for future vaccines, and thus encourage research on
new vaccines.  Although the standard EPI package of vaccines is widely distributed, a number of
effective vaccines that are already available are not fully used.
24 Purchasing and distributing
existing vaccines which are not widely used in developing countries, such as Haemophilus
influenzae b (Hib) vaccine, would be a cost-effective way to save many lives.
However, by itself, paying more for currently available vaccines may not make
pharmaceutical firms confident that they will be rewarded for developing new vaccines.  It could
easily take ten years to develop malaria, tuberculosis, or HIV vaccines, and developers would
need to recoup their investment through sales in the ten years following the vaccines’
development.  Since international interest in health in developing countries is fickle,
pharmaceutical firms might well feel that the availability of funds to purchase Hib vaccine now
at a remunerative price does not guarantee that the international community would be prepared to
                                               
24 For example, the hepatitis B vaccine is underused.  An effective vaccine for malaria or one of the other major
killers would likely be consumed much more widely than the hepatitis B vaccine, since the disease burden of
hepatitis B is small relative to that of AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria.  Moreover, malaria kills young children very
quickly after infection and the onset of symptoms, whereas hepatitis B infection can remain asymptomatic for
decades, and many people may not understand its relation to the deaths it causes from primary hepatic cancer in
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pay for future vaccines fifteen years from now.  Legally binding commitments to purchase future
vaccines would still play a critical role in spurring research.
Moreover, given that the Hib vaccine was developed without any expectation of realizing
substantial profits in developing countries, paying more than pharmaceutical firms could
reasonably have expected for these vaccines would provide extra profits to pharmaceutical firms.
Providing these extra profits might be worthwhile if it were the only way to establish a reputation
for paying remunerative prices for future vaccines.  Not surprisingly, pharmaceutical
manufacturers argue that the best way to persuade them that work on future vaccines would be
rewarded would be to buy currently available vaccines at a high price.  However, if it were
possible to commit now to purchase future vaccines at a remunerative price, there would be no
reason to pay more for current vaccines than had been implicitly or explicitly promised to
vaccine developers.  Paying high prices for both current and future vaccines as a way of
encouraging future research amounts to paying twice.
Finally, some argue that increasing current vaccine sales will increase vaccine R&D
budgets because pharmaceutical firms finance research on a division by division basis, as a
percentage of current sales.  It is possible that some firms might use such a rule of thumb to
reduce unproductive competition for funds among divisions seeking to increase their R&D
budgets.  While some pharmaceutical firms may find this rough rule of thumb useful under the
current environment, if the environment changes, they will have incentives to change these rules.
In particular, if there is an explicit, credible commitment to purchase vaccines, there is reason to
think that companies would change their R&D budgeting rules.  Finally, note that even if some
firms are particularly subject to wasteful internal budget battles and therefore impose draconianSection 4: Alternative Pull Programs 42
internal budget rules, there will be even greater incentives for other firms to expand R&D and for
new biotech firms to enter the field in response to increased markets.
In summary, increased purchases and delivery of existing vaccines are likely to be very
cost-effective ways of saving lives in their own right.  However, in order to motivate R&D on
future vaccines, it is necessary to supplement increased purchases of existing vaccines with
explicit commitments to reward developers of future vaccines.  Paying more for existing
vaccines than vaccine developers could have reasonably expected when they invested in research
is likely to be an expensive way of encouraging research on future vaccines.Conclusion 43
5.  Conclusion
This paper has argued that private incentives for research on vaccines for malaria,
tuberculosis, and strains of HIV common in Africa likely to be a small fraction of the social
value of new vaccines, so that under current institutions, potential vaccine developers would
have incentives to pass up socially valuable research opportunities.  Moreover, if vaccines were
developed, access to vaccines would be limited if they were sold at monopoly prices.
Commitments to purchase vaccines and make them available to developing countries for
modest co-payments could both provide incentives for development of vaccines, and ensure that
vaccines reach those who need them.  Taxpayers would pay only if a vaccine were developed.
A companion paper, “Creating Markets for New Vaccines: Part II: Design Issues,”
discusses the design of these vaccine purchase commitments.References 44
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